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David Ellerman
CATEGORY THEORY AND SET THEORY
AS THEORIES ABOUT COMPLEMENTARY
TYPES OF UNIVERSALS
Abstract. Instead of the half-century old foundational feud between set
theory and category theory, this paper argues that they are theories about
two different complementary types of universals. The set-theoretic anti-
nomies forced naïve set theory to be reformulated using some iterative no-
tion of a set so that a set would always have higher type or rank than its
members. Then the universal uF = {x | F (x)} for a property F (.) could
never be self-predicative in the sense of uF ∈ uF . But the mathemati-
cal theory of categories, dating from the mid-twentieth century, includes a
theory of always-self-predicative universals  which can be seen as forming
the “other bookend” to the never-self-predicative universals of set theory.
The self-predicative universals of category theory show that the problem in
the antinomies was not self-predication per se, but negated self-predication.
They also provide a model (in the Platonic Heaven of mathematics) for the
self-predicative strand of Plato’s Theory of Forms as well as for the idea of
a “concrete universal” in Hegel and similar ideas of paradigmatic exemplars
in ordinary thought.
Keywords: universals; category theory; Plato’s Theory of Forms; set theo-
retic antinomies; universal mapping properties
1. Introduction
Over the last half century, there has been a foundational feud between
set theory and category theory. The purpose of this paper is to argue
that this (often silly) feud should be replaced by the view that, at least as
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theories of universals, the two theories are quite complementary book-
ends: set theory as the theory of never-self-predicative universals and
category theory as the theory of always self-predicative universals.
According to the naïve concept of a set, given a predicate F (not
involving y), then there exists a set y such that for all x, x ∈ y if and
only if (iff) F (x) [4, p. 217]. Such a comprehension scheme establishes y
as a type of universal, which might be denoted as uF , for the property
F (.). But the set-theoretic antinomies forced the naïve set theory of
Frege’s Paradise to be reconstructed in accordance with models designed
to prevent any self-membership (see [4, 31]).1 In the formal systems of
axiomatic set theory, self-membership uF ∈ uF (e.g., for the property
F (x) ≡ x /∈ x) was ruled out, e.g., by the axiom of regularity in Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory. The set-universals in the resulting models were
always non-self-predicative. Self-predication was even seen as the culprit
in the antinomies.
The idea of universals goes back to Plato’s theory of ideas (the epsilon
of set membership derives from ειδη for ideas), and the self-predicative
version sounds, to modern ears, like some “bad Platonic metaphysics”
such as the following:
Given all the entities that have a certain property, there is one
entity among them that exemplifies the property in a universal,
paradigmatic, archetypical, ideal, essential, or canonical way. It
is called the “self-predicative universal.” There is a relationship
of “participation” or “resemblance” so that all and only the en-
tities that have the property (including itself) “participate in” or
“resemble” that perfect example, the self-predicative universal.
But self-predication has taken a “bum rap.” Around the middle of the
20th century, a new mathematical theory, category theory (Mac Lane
[18]; Awodey [3]), was developed which featured universals that were
always self-predicative. The antinomies showed there could not be one
theory where the universals could be non-self-predicative and also self-
predicative. Instead, there are two theories of universals, one theory
where the set-universals are never self-predicative (with set membership
1 The rough idea is to start of some urelements (individuals not involving sets) or
possibly none, and at stage zero, construct all sets of urelements (including the empty
set). At stage one, construct all sets of sets of urelements and of urelements. At each
stage, a set may contain any urelements or sets constructed at an earlier stage  so
no set could be a member of itself.
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as the participation relation) as well as the other bookend where the uni-
versals are always self-predicative (the universal morphisms of category
theory).
A simple example using sets will illustrate the points. Given two
sets a and b, consider the property of sets: F (x) ≡ x ⊆ a & x ⊆ b. In
other words, the property is the property of being both a subset of a and
a subset of b. In this example, the participation relation is the subset
inclusion relation (which, unlike set membership, is a morphism in the
category theoretic sense). There is a set, namely the intersection or meet
of a and b, denoted a ∩ b, that has the property (so it is a “concrete”
instance of the property), and it is universal in the sense that any other
set has the property if and only if it participates in (i.e., is included in)
the universal example:
self-predication: F (a ∩ b), i.e., a ∩ b ⊆ a and a ∩ b ⊆ b, and
universality: x participates in a ∩ b if and only if F (x), i.e.,
x ⊆ a ∩ b if and only if x ⊆ a and x ⊆ b.
This example of a self-predicative universal is quite simple, but all this
“bad metaphysical talk” has highly developed and precise models in cat-
egory theory.
In terms of the old theme of universals in philosophy, the self-predica-
tive universals of category theory provide a rigorous model (in the “Pla-
tonic Heaven” of mathematics) for the self-predicative strand in Plato’s
thought and the “concrete universal” (Ellerman [6]; Honderich [12, Entry
at “Concrete Universal”]) version of synthesis in Hegel’s thought as well
as for the common “Form” of thought that considers a paradigmatic
(Sayre [30]), canonical, iconic, archetypical, or quintessential exemplar
of some property. Perhaps due to their mathematical nature, these self-
predicative universals of category theory seem to be unknown in the
contemporary philosophical literature (e.g., [8]).
2. Criteria for a Theory of Universals
In Plato’s Theory of Ideas or Forms (ειδη), a property F has an entity
associated with it, the universal uF , which uniquely represents the prop-
erty. An object x has the property F , i.e., F (x), if and only if (iff) the
object x participates in the universal uF .
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Let µ (from µεθεξις or methexis for participation) represent the par-
ticipation relation so
‘x µ uF ” reads as “x participates in uF ”.
Given a relation µ, an entity uF is said to be a universal for the
property F (with respect to µ) if it satisfies the following universality
condition:
for any x, x µ uF if and only if F (x).
A universal representing a property should be in some sense unique.
Hence there should be an equivalence relation (≈) so that universals
satisfy a uniqueness condition:
if uF and u
′
F are universals for the same F , then uF ≈ u
′
F .
A mathematical theory is said to be a theory of universals [6] if
it contains a binary relation µ and an equivalence relation ≈ so that
with certain properties F there are associated entities uF satisfying the
following conditions:
(I) Universality: for any x, x µ uF iff F (x), and
(II) Uniqueness: if uF and u
′




A universal uF is said to be abstract or non-self-predicative if it does
not participate in itself, i.e., uF ). A universal uF is self-predicative or
concrete if it participates in itself, i.e., uF µ uF .
3. Set Theory as the Theory of Non-self-predicative Universals
There is a modern mathematical theory that readily qualifies as a the-
ory of universals, namely set theory. In the naïve form of set theory
(“Frege’s Paradise”), the universal representing a property F is the set
of all elements with the property:
uF = {x | F (x)}.
The participation relation is the set membership relation. The uni-
versality condition in (naïve) set theory is the comprehension axiom:
there is a set y such that for any x, x ∈ y iff F (x). Set theory also
has an extensionality axiom, which states that two sets with the same
members are identical:
for all x, (x ∈ y iff x ∈ y′) implies y = y′.
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Thus, if y and y′ both satisfy the comprehension axiom scheme for
the same F then y and y′ have the same members so y = y′. Hence in
set theory, the uniqueness condition on universals is satisfied with the
equivalence relation (≈) as equality (=) between sets. Thus naïve set
theory satisfies the conditions for a theory of universals  if only it was
consistent. The naïve comprehension axiom lead to inconsistency for
such properties as
F (x) ≡ “x is not a member of x” ≡ x /∈ x.
If R is the universal for that property, i.e., R is the set of all sets which
are not members of themselves, the naïve comprehension axiom yields a
contradiction (Russell’s Paradox):
R ∈ R iff R /∈ R .
The characteristic feature of Russell’s Paradox and the other set the-
oretical paradoxes is the negated self-reference wherein the universal is
allowed to qualify for the negated property represented by the universal,
e.g., the Russell set R is allowed to be one of the x’s in the universality
relation: x ∈ R iff x /∈ x. The set-theoretic formulation of the paradox
was not essential. Russell himself expounded the paradox in term of
the property of predicates that they are not self-predicative, i.e., the
“predicates which are not predicable of themselves” (Russell [28, p. 80]).
There are several ways to restrict the naïve comprehension axiom
to defeat the set theoretical paradoxes, e.g., as in Russell’s type theory,
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, or von-Neumann-Bernays set theory. The
various restrictions are based on an iterative concept of set (Boolos [4])
which forces a set y to be more “abstract”, e.g., of higher type or rank
(e.g., [31, p. 304]), than the elements x ∈ y. As Russell himself put it
using a notion of “degree”:
It will now be necessary to distinguish (1) terms, (2) classes, (3) classes
of classes, and so on ad infinitum; we shall have to hold that no member
of one set is a member of any other set, and that x ∈ u requires that
x should be of a set of a degree lower by one than the set to which u
belongs. Thus x ∈ x will become a meaningless proposition; and in this
way the contradiction is avoided. [28, p. 527]
Thus the universals provided by the various set theories are “ab-
stract” universals in the technical sense that they are relatively more ab-
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stract (i.e., of higher type or rank) than the objects having the property
represented by the universal. Sets may not be members of themselves.2
With the modifications to avoid the paradoxes, a set theory still qual-
ifies as a theory of universals. For suitably restricted predicates, there
exists a set of the elements with that property and the set satisfies the
universality condition with membership as the participation relation and
extensional equality as the equivalence relation. But set theory cannot
qualify as a general theory of universals. The paradox-induced modifi-
cations turn the various set theories into theories of abstract (never-self-
predicative) universals since they prohibit the self-membership of sets.
That clears the ground for another theory of always-self-predicative uni-
versals.
4. Self-Predicative or Concrete Universals in Philosophy
Philosophy has long contemplated another type of universal, variously
called a self-predicative, self-participating, or concrete universal. Indeed,
it is a common Form of thought. The intuitive idea of a self-participating
universal for a property is that it is an object that has the property and
has it in such a universal sense that all other objects with the prop-
erty resemble or participate in that paradigmatic, archetypal, canonical,
iconic, ideal, essential, or quintessential exemplar. Such a universal uF
for a property F is self-predicative in the sense that it has the property
itself, i.e., F (uF ). It is universal in the intuitive sense that it represents
F -ness is such a perfect and exemplary manner that any object resembles
or participates in the universal uF if and only if it has the property F .
If anything else is beautiful besides Beauty itself, it is beautiful for no
other reason than because it participates in that Beauty.
Phaedo 100, translation from [7, p. 35]
The intuitive notion of a concrete universal or paradigmatic instance
occurs in ordinary thought as in the “all-American boy” or any case of a
quintessential iconic example (e.g., Sophia Loren as “the” Italian women
or Michelangelo’s David or da Vinci’s Mona Lisa as “the” exemplars for
certain artistic categories), or when resemblance to an “defining” exam-
ple becomes an adjective like “Lincolnesqe.” In Greek-inspired Christian
2 Quine’s system ML [27] allows “V ∈ V ” for the universal class V , but no
standard model of ML has ever been found where “∈” is interpreted as set membership
(Hatcher [11, Chapter 7]).
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theology, there is the “Word made Flesh” (Miles [24]) together with imi-
tatio Christi as the participation or resemblance relation to that concrete
universal. The idea of the concrete universal is often associated with
Hegel (Stern [32]) where it was one way to think about the synthesis
between an abstract universal thesis and the antithesis of diverse partic-
ulars. One sensible application by Hegel was in the arts and literature
(Wimsatt [37]) to explicate the old idea that great art uses a concrete
instance to universally exemplify certain human conditions, e.g., Shake-
speare’s Romeo and Juliet as “the” romantic tragedy (Desmond [5]).
The notion of a self-predicative universal goes back to Plato’s Theory
of Forms (Vlastos [33, 34, 35]; Malcolm [22]). Plato’s forms are often
considered to be abstract or non-self-predicative universals quite distinct
from and “above” the instances. In the words of one Plato scholar,
“not even God can scratch Doghood behind the Ears” (Allen [1]). But
Plato did give examples of self-participation or self-predication, e.g., that
Justice is just [Protagoras 330] or that Beauty is beautiful. Moreover,
Plato used expressions that indicated self-predication of universals.
But Plato also used language which suggests not only that the Forms
exist separately (χωριστα) from all the particulars, but also that each
Form is a peculiarly accurate or good particular of its own kind, i.e., the
standard particular of the kind in question or the model (piαραδειγµα)
to which other particulars approximate. [14, p. 19]
But many scholars regard the notion of a Form as paradeigma or self-
predicative universal as an error.
For general characters are not characterized by themselves: hu-
manity is not human. The mistake is encouraged by the fact
that in Greek the same phrase may signify both the concrete
and the abstract, e.g. λευκoν (literally “the white”) both “the
white thing” and “whiteness”, so that it is doubtful whether αυτo
τo λευκoν (literally “the white itself”) means “the superlatively
white thing” or “whiteness in abstraction”. [14, pp. 19–20]
Thus, some Platonic language is ambivalent between interpreting a form
as a paradigmatic exemplar (“the superlatively white thing”) and an
abstract universal (“whiteness in abstraction”).
The literature on Plato has reached no resolution on the question of
self-predication. Scholarship has left Plato on both sides of the fence;
many universals are not self-predicative but some are. It is fitting that
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Plato should exhibit this ambivalence since the self-predication issue
has only come to a head in the 20th century with the set theoretical
antinomies. Set theory had to be reconstructed as a theory of universals
(for the set-membership relation) that were never self-predicative. That
cleared the ground for a separate theory of universals that are always
self-predicative. Such a theory of self-predicative universals would realize
the self-predicative strand of Plato’s Theory of Forms.
5. Self-predicative Universals in Partial Orders
A theory of (always) self-predicative universals would have an appropri-
ate participation relation µ so that for certain properties F , there are
entities uF satisfying the universality condition:
for any x, x µ uF iff F (x).
The universality condition and F (uF ) imply that uF is a concrete uni-
versal in the previously defined sense of being self-predicative, uF µ uF .
A theory of self-predicative universals would also have to have an equiv-
alence relation so the self-predicative universals for the same property
would be the universal up to that equivalence relation.
Is there a precise mathematical theory of the common Form of
thought, the self-predicative universal? Our claim is that category the-
ory is precisely that theory where the self-predicative universal objects
are characterized by “universal mapping properties” (UMPs). Most (but
not all) UMPs are expressed using adjoint functors because adjointness
isolates “what is universal in mathematics” (Lawvere [15, p. 281])
The simplest examples of categories are partially ordered sets.3 Con-
sider the universe of subsets or power set ℘(U) of a set U with the
inclusion relation ⊆ as the partial ordering relation. Given subsets a
and b, consider the property
G(x) ≡ a ⊆ x & b ⊆ x .
The participation relation is the reverse of set inclusion ⊇ and the
union a ∪ b is the universal uG for this property G(x). The universality
3 A binary relation ≤ on U is a partial order if for all u, u′, u′′ ∈ U , it is reflexive
(u ≤ u), transitive (u ≤ u′ and u′ ≤ u′′ imply u ≤ u′′), and anti-symmetric (u ≤ u′
and u′ ≤ u imply u = u′).
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relation states that the union is the least upper bound of a and b in the
inclusion ordering:
for any x, x ⊇ a ∪ b iff a ⊆ x & b ⊆ x.
The universal has the property it represents, i.e., a ⊆ a ∪ b and
b ⊆ a ∪ b, so it is a self-predicative or concrete universal.4 Two self-
predicative universals for the same property must participate in each
other. In partially ordered sets, the antisymmetry condition, y ⊆ y′ &
y′ ⊆ y implies y = y′, means that equality can serve as the equivalence
relation in the uniqueness condition for universals in a partial order.
There is much controversy in Platonic scholarship about self-predica-
tion (see Malcolm [22] for a summary and more references). Our purpose
is not Plato exegesis. But the development of a mathematical theory of
self-predicative universals in category theory does help by showing one
way to sort out Plato’s Ideas.
One simple point is that there can be both non-self-predicative and
self-predicative universals for the same property F (x), and both are dis-
tinct from that property. Given subsets a, b ⊆ U , consider the property:
F (x) ≡ x ⊆ a & x ⊆ b. The self-predicative universal (or “paradigmatic
instance” in Platonic language) for that property is the intersection a∩b
where the participation relation is inclusion ⊆ (Universality condition
for self-predicative universal):
∀x ⊆ U : x ⊆ a ∩ b iff F (x)
The power set ℘(a∩b) is the non-self-predicative universal for that prop-
erty where the participation relation is set membership (Universality
condition for non-self-predicative universal):
∀x ⊆ U : x ∈ ℘(a ∩ b) iff F (x) .
The self-predicative universal a ∩ b has the property, i.e., a ∩ b ⊆ a &
a∩ b ⊆ b, while the non-self-predicative universal ℘(a∩ b) does not have
the property, and neither universal is to be confused with the property
F (x) ≡ x ⊆ a & x ⊆ b itself.
4 These universals are “concrete” in the technical sense of being “One among the
many.” They are not relatively abstract or “One over the many” like a universal in set
theory relative to its members. Of course, the concrete universals of category theory
are abstract (in the usual sense) mathematical entities in “Plato’s Heaven” and are
not ordinary concrete objects [23].
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6. Self-predicative Universals in General Categories
The self-predicative universals of category theory5 are usually presented
as universal mapping properties and the participation relation is the
uniquely-factors-through relation. It can always be formulated in a suit-
able category as:
“x µ uF ” means “there exists a unique arrow x→ uF ”.
Then x is said to uniquely factor through uF , and the arrow x →
uF is the unique factor or participation morphism. In the universality
condition,
x µ uF if and only if F (x),
the existence of the identity arrow 1uF : uF → uF is the self-participation
of the self-predicative universal that corresponds with F (uF ), the self-
predication of the property to uF . In category theory, the equivalence
relation used in the uniqueness condition is the isomorphism (∼=).6
It is sometimes convenient to “turn the arrows around” and use the
dual definition where “x µ uG” means “there exists a unique arrow uG →
x that can also be viewed as the original definition stated in the dual or
opposite category. The above treatment of the intersection a∩ b and the
union a ∪ b are dual to one another. If we think of “participation” as
transferring the property from the universal to the instances, then the
transferring may go along the direction of the arrow  so the property
may be said to be transmitted to the instance  or the transferring may
go against the direction of the arrow  so the property may be said to
be reflected to the instance. If we take the inclusion ⊆ as the direction
of the arrow → for a partial order as a category, then in the case of the
union, x ⊇ a ∪ b iff G(x), the union a ∪ b transmitted the property G to
the particular x, and in the case of the intersection, x ⊆ a ∩ b iff F (x),
the intersection a ∩ b reflected the property F to the particular x.
5 For more philosophically-oriented introductions to category theory, see Lawvere
and Schanuel [16], Magnan and Reyes [21], or Awodey [3].
6 Thus it must be verified that two concrete universals for the same property are
isomorphic. By the universality condition, two concrete universals u and u′ for the
same property must participate in each other. Let f : u′ → u and g : u → u′ be the
unique arrows given by the mutual participation. Then by composition gf : u′ → u′
is the unique arrow u′ → u′ but 1u′ is another such arrow so by uniqueness, gf = 1
′
u.
Similarly, fg : u → u is the unique self-participation arrow for u so fg = 1u. Thus
mutual participation of u and u′ implies the isomorphism u ∼= u′.
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One of the earliest examples of a univeral mapping property to be
isolated and characterized was the direct product of, say, two sets A and
B [17]. The property in question is:
P (f, g) ≡ “f : X → A and g : X → B is a pair or ‘cone’ {f, g} of
set functions from any set X to A and to B.”
The self-predicative universal for this property is the pair of projec-
tion maps pA : A×B → A and pB : A×B → B from the Cartesian prod-
uct A× B = {(a, b) : a ∈ A; b ∈ B} to A and to B where pA((a, b)) = a
and similarly for pB. Then any such pair of maps f : X → A and
g : X → B uniquely factors through the projections by the participation
map 〈f, g〉 : X → A × B which takes x ∈ X to (f(x), g(x)) ∈ A × B.




−→ A = X
f
−→ A,




−→ B = X
g
−→ B.
That is, in the diagrammatic language of category theory, the partici-
pation map 〈f, g〉 is the unique map that makes the two triangles in the
following diagram commute.
Figure 1. Universal mapping property for Cartesian product of sets
In this case, since the direction of the participation map 〈f, g〉 is to-
wards the universal, we would say the universal pair, {pA, pB} reflects
the property back to the instance {f, g} of the property. The universality
condition is:
{f, g} uniquely factors through {pA, pB} iff P (f, g).
The self-predicative universal {pA, pB} uniquely factors through itself by
the identity map 1A×B and the product A × B is unique up to isomor-
phism (in the category of sets and functions).
Another early example of a universal mapping property (Samuel [29])
was the free group F [X ] generated by a set X . The property in this
case is:
P (ϕ) ≡ “ϕ : X → G is a map from the set X to any group G”.
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The self-predicative universal for this property is the injection of the
generators map ηX : X → F [X ]. Then for any set-to-group map ϕ : X →
G from the given setX to any group G, there is a unique group homomor-
phism f : F [X ]→ G so that the insertion of the generators ηX followed
by f gives ϕ, i.e., X
ηX
−→ F [X ]
f
−→ G = X
ϕ
−→ G. Hence f is the unique
group homomorphism that makes the following diagram commute.
Figure 2. Universal mapping property for the free group
In this case, the participation morphism f takes the universal ηX to the
instance ϕ of the property so it transmits the property in question from
the universal to the instance. The universality condition is:
ϕ uniquely factors through ηX iff P (ϕ).
This universality condition is just a reformulation of the usual universal
mapping property of free groups. For instance, here is that UMP as
stated in an algebra text (using our notation):
Let F [X] be the free group on a set X and ηX : X → F [X] the inclusion
map. If G is a group and ϕ : X → G a map of sets, then there exists a
unique homomorphism of groups f : F [X] → G such that fηX = ϕ.
[13, p. 65]
The self-predicative universal ηX uniquely factors through itself by the
identity group homomorphism 1F [X] and the free group F [X ] is unique
up to isomorphism (in the category of groups and group homomor-
phisms). All the UMPs of category theory can be reformulated in a sim-
ilar manner as self-predicative universals for certain mapping properties.
Category theory as the theory of self-predicative universals has quite
a different flavor from set theory, the theory of abstract non-self-pred-
icative universals. Given an appropriately delimited collection of all the
elements with a property, set theory can postulate a more abstract entity,
the set of those elements, to be the universal. But category theory cannot
postulate its universals because those universals are self-predicative, i.e.,
are the “One among the many”  if any. Category theory must find its
universals, if at all, among the many entities with the property.
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7. Self-Predicative Universals and the Antinomies
The flaw or “mistake” in the set-theoretic paradoxes and similar self-
referential antimonies is often taken to be the self-reference or self-
predication.
In all the above contradictions (which are merely selections from an
indefinite number) there is a common characteristic, which we may
describe as self-reference or reflexiveness. [36, p. 61]
The iterative notion of a set requires the universal for a property to
be of higher type or rank than the instances so that “x ∈ x will be-
come a meaningless proposition; and in this way the contradiction is
avoided.” To avoid the paradoxes, Whitehead and Russell postulated the
vicious circle principle: “Whatever involves all of a collection must not
be one of the collection.” (Whitehead and Russell [36, p. 37]) But a self-
predicative universal of category theory is the “One among the many”
that transfers the property to all the instances so it is “impredicative” or
self-predicative7 in violation of the vicious circle principle. Indeed, the
universals of category theory are always self-predicative via the identity
morphisms so the question arises of how category theory avoids similar
paradoxes.
All morphisms can be seen as “uniquely factoring through” them-
selves by the identity morphism (at either the head or tail of the arrow) 
so the construction of something like “a universal morphism for all those
morphisms that don’t factor through themselves” would always come up
empty. Abstractly put, there can be no self-predicative universal for the
property of not being self-predicative  since the universal needs to have
the property that is “transferred” to the instances by their “participa-
tion” in the universal and that particular negative property would always
be defeated by the universal’s identity morphism. Thus the problem with
7 The connection between the self-predicative or “impredicative” definitions
(which caused the problems in naïve set theory) and the self-predicative univer-
sals of category theory has not escaped the attention of category theorists. For
instance, Michael Makkai notes that the “Peano system” of natural numbers is the
self-predicative universal for the property of being a “pre-Peano system”: “we can
say that a Peano system is distinguished among pre-Peano systems by the fact that
it has exactly one morphism to any pre-Peano system. (An ’impredicative’ definition
if there ever was one!)” (Makkai [20, p. 52]) See Mac Lane and Birkhoff for a full
explanation of that “Peano-Lawvere Axiom” [19, p. 67] characterizing the Natural
Numbers as the self-predicative universal for counting systems.
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the paradoxes was not the self-predication per se but the negated self-
predication, and that is defeated in category theory by the universals
being always self-predicative (by the identity morphisms). The “circle”
or self-reference is not the problem if all the circles are required to be
“virtuous” so that a “vicious” circle cannot arise.
8. The Third Man Argument
Much of the modern Platonic literature on self-participation and self-
predication (Nehamas [25]; Allen [2]; Malcolm [22]) stems from the work
of Geach [9] and Vlastos [33] on the Third Man Argument. The name
derives from Aristotle (who denied self-predication), but the argument
occurs in the dialogues.
But now take largeness itself and the other things which are large.
Suppose you look at all these in the same way in your mind’s eye, will
not yet another unity make its appearance  a largeness by virtue of
which they all appear large?
So it would seem.
If so, a second form of largeness will present itself, over and above
largeness itself and the things that share in it, and again, covering all
these, yet another, which will make all of them large. So each of your
forms will no longer be one, but an indefinite number.
[Parmenides, 132]
If a form is self-predicative, the participation relation can be inter-
preted as “resemblance.” An instance has the property F because it
resembles the paradigmatic example of F -ness. But then, the Third
Man Argument contends, the common property shared by Largeness
and other large things gives rise to a “One over the many”, a form
Largeness* such that Largeness and the large things share the common
property by virtue of resembling Largeness*. And the argument repeats
itself giving rise to an infinite regress of forms. A key part of the Third
Man Argument is what Vlastos calls the Non-Identity thesis:
NI If anything has a given character by participating in a Form, it is
not identical with that Form. [33, p. 351]
It implies that Largeness* is not identical with Largeness.
P. T. Geach [9] has developed a self-predicative interpretation of
Forms as standards or norms, an idea he attributes to Wittgenstein.
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A stick is a meter long because it resembles, lengthwise, the standard
meter measure. Geach avoids the Third Man regress with the exception-
alist device of holding the Form “separate” from the many so they could
not be grouped together to give rise to a new “One over the many.” Geach
aptly notes the analogy with Frege’s ad hoc and unsuccessful attempt
to avoid the Russell-type paradoxes by allowing a set of all and only
the sets which are not members of themselves  except for that set itself
(Quine [26]; Geach [10]).
The category-theoretic model for self-predicative universals shows
that the flaw in the Third Man argument lies not in self-predication but
in the Non-Identity thesis. “The One” is not necessarily “over the many”;
it can be (isomorphic to) one among the many. In the special case of sets
ordered by inclusion, the union or intersection of a collection of sets is
not necessarily distinct from the sets in the collection; the “One” could
be one among the many.
For example, let A =
⋃
{Aβ} be the One formed as the union of a
collection of many sets {Aβ} [like ℘(a∩b)]. Then add A to the collection




This operation leads to no Third Man regress since A∗ = A.
9. Conclusion
Whitehead described European philosophy as a series of footnotes to
Plato, and the Theory of Forms was central to Plato’s thought. We
have seen that the self-predicative universals of category theory provide
a rigorous mathematical model for the self-predicative strain in Plato’s
Theory of Forms and for the intuitive notion of a concrete universal or
paradigmatic exemplar elsewhere in philosophy, literature, and ordinary
thought.
Moreover, the always-self-predicative universals of category theory
“complete the picture” of the antinomies in Frege’s Paradise; one cannot
have one theory of universals that could be either non-self-predicative
or self-predicative. The “problem” in the antinomies was not the self-
predication per se but allowing negated self-predication. That leaves two
ways to avoid the antinomies in a theory of universals, have never-self-
predicative universals in the presence of a negation operation (i.e., in set
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theory) or always-self-predicative universals without negation (category
theory). The always-self-predicative universals of category theory form
the complementary bookend to the never-self-predicative universals of
set theory which at least at the conceptual level should foster some
peaceful coexistence between these two foundational theories.
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